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Security Advisories: GSA_kwCzR0hTQS03eGcyLTgzZjgtMzltcs4AA4Lf

The DES/3DES cipher was used as part of the TLS protocol by installation tools

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

The Karmada components deployed with karmadactl, karma-operator, and helm chart take Golang default cipher suites as part of the TLS protocol, which includes the insecure algorithm. Referring to https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476#issuecomment-694914728, the 3DES algorithm vulnerability is very unlikely to be attacked. However, to address the concerns and to avoid being disturbed by the security scanner, Karmada has decided to limit the cipher suites to exclude the insecure 3DES algorithm and accordingly release this security advisory.

The components affected are：

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

From Karmada v1.8.0, when deploying Karmada with karmadactl, karma-operator, and helm chart, the default minimum TLS version of components(include karmada-apiserver, karmada-aggregated-apiserver, karmada-search, and karmada-metrics-adapter) would be set to TLS1.3 to get rid of the insecure algorithm, and set default cipher suites(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305) for etcd.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

By setting the --tls-min-version for the affected components to TLS 1.3, or explicitly setting the --cipher-suites to secure algorithms.

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

  1. Enhancements made from the Karmada community: https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/issues/4191
  2. Impact discussions from the Golang community: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476
Permalink: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr
JSON: https://advisories.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/advisories/GSA_kwCzR0hTQS03eGcyLTgzZjgtMzltcs4AA4Lf
Source: GitHub Advisory Database
Origin: Unspecified
Severity: Low
Classification: General
Published: 4 months ago
Updated: 4 months ago


Identifiers: GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr
References: Repository: https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada
Blast Radius: 0.0

Affected Packages

go:github.com/karmada-io/karmada
Dependent packages: 7
Dependent repositories: 6
Downloads:
Affected Version Ranges: < 1.8.0
Fixed in: 1.8.0
All affected versions: 0.1.0, 0.2.0, 0.3.0, 0.4.0, 0.5.0, 0.6.0, 0.7.0, 0.8.0, 0.9.0, 0.10.0, 0.10.1, 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, 1.0.4, 1.0.5, 1.1.0, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3, 1.1.4, 1.1.5, 1.1.6, 1.2.0, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.2.6, 1.2.7, 1.3.0, 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.3.6, 1.4.0, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.3, 1.4.4, 1.4.5, 1.5.0, 1.5.1, 1.5.2, 1.5.3, 1.5.4, 1.5.5, 1.6.0, 1.6.1, 1.6.2, 1.6.3, 1.6.4, 1.6.5, 1.6.6, 1.7.0, 1.7.1, 1.7.2, 1.7.3, 1.7.4
All unaffected versions: 1.8.0, 1.8.1, 1.8.2, 1.8.3, 1.9.0, 1.9.1