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Security Advisories: GSA_kwCzR0hTQS0yNTlwLXJ2angtZmZ3Z84AA5Kd

Panel::Software Customized WiX .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges


.be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges.


If the bundle is not run as admin, the user's TEMP folder is used and not the system TEMP folder. A utility is able to monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes and drop its own DLL into the .be/.Local folder immediately when the .be folder is created. When the burn engine elevates, the malicious DLL receives elevated privileges.


As a standard, non-admin user:

  1. Monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes using ReadDirectoryChangesW
  2. On FILE_ACTION_ADDED, check if the folder name is .be
  3. Create a folder in .be named after the bundle + .Local (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local)
  4. Put the malicious COMCTL32.DLL in the .Local folder following the naming used for the real DLL (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local/
  5. Do hacker things when the engine escalates and the malicious DLL is loaded

Proper naming for the path can be obtained by using GetModuleHandle("comctl32.dll") and GetModuleFileName.


DLL redirection utilizing .exe.Local Windows capability. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework.

Source: GitHub Advisory Database
Origin: Unspecified
Severity: High
Classification: General
Published: 22 days ago
Updated: 22 days ago

CVSS Score: 8.2
CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Identifiers: GHSA-259p-rvjx-ffwg

Affected Packages

Versions: < 3.15.0-a44
Fixed in: 3.15.0-a44