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Security Advisories: GSA_kwCzR0hTQS1mcGdmLXBqanYtMnFnbc4AAvIi
matrix-android-sdk2 vulnerable to Olm/Megolm protocol confusion
Impact
An attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield.
Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device.
These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm.
Patches
matrix-android-sdk2 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption.
Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added:
- Cleartext
m.room_key
,m.forwarded_room_key
andm.secret.send
to_device messages are discarded. - Secrets received from untrusted devices are discarded.
- Key backups are only usable if they have a valid signature from a trusted device (no more local trust, or trust-on-decrypt).
- The origin of a to-device message should only be determined by observing the Olm session which managed to decrypt the message, and not by using claimed sender_key, user_id, or any other fields controllable by the homeserver.
Workarounds
As this attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, if you trust your home server no particular workaround is needed. Notice that the backup spoofing attack is a particularly sophisticated targeted attack.
We are not aware of this attack being used in the wild, though specifying a false positive-free way of noticing malicious key backups key is challenging.
As an abundance of caution, to avoid malicious backup attacks, you should not verify your new logins using emoji/QR verifications methods until patched. Prefer using verify with passphrase.
References
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, e-mail us at [email protected].
Permalink: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgmJSON: https://advisories.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/advisories/GSA_kwCzR0hTQS1mcGdmLXBqanYtMnFnbc4AAvIi
Source: GitHub Advisory Database
Origin: Unspecified
Severity: High
Classification: General
Published: over 1 year ago
Updated: over 1 year ago
CVSS Score: 8.6
CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
Identifiers: GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm, CVE-2022-39248
References:
- https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/security/advisories/GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39248
- https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/commit/77df720a238d17308deab83ecaa37f7a4740a17e
- https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/releases/tag/v1.5.1
- https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm
Blast Radius: 6.0
Affected Packages
maven:org.matrix.android:matrix-android-sdk2
Dependent packages: 0Dependent repositories: 5
Downloads:
Affected Version Ranges: <= 1.4.36
Fixed in: 1.5.1
All affected versions: 0.0.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.3.0, 1.3.2, 1.3.4, 1.3.7, 1.3.8, 1.3.9, 1.3.10, 1.3.13, 1.3.14, 1.3.18, 1.4.2, 1.4.4, 1.4.11, 1.4.13, 1.4.14, 1.4.16, 1.4.25, 1.4.27, 1.4.32, 1.4.34, 1.4.36
All unaffected versions: 1.5.1, 1.5.2, 1.5.4, 1.5.7, 1.5.8, 1.5.11, 1.5.18, 1.5.20, 1.5.22, 1.5.25, 1.5.26, 1.5.30, 1.6.10