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Security Advisories: MDE2OlNlY3VyaXR5QWR2aXNvcnlHSFNBLXhtaDktcmc2Zi1qM21y
Verification flaw in Solid identity-token-verifier
Any Pod on a Solid server using a vulnerable version of the identity-token-verifier library is at risk of a spoofed Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession (DPoP) token binding. This vulnerability could give total and complete access to a targeted Pod.
A verification flaw in the implementation of the identity token verifier library (https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier) allows DPoP proofs to be spoofed.
DPoP proofs are used to bind access tokens to a private key meant to be in sole possession of a specific user. Instead of verifying against the hash of an embedded public key, the library instead verifies against a field that an attacker can modify to spoof another user’s DPoP.
A stolen DPoP proof, when used in the right context, therefore allows the rebinding of a DPoP-bound access token. Any attacker in possession of a targeted access token could build an attack environment to replay it on any Pod service with this vulnerability.
A new version 0.5.2 of identity-token-verifier fixes the verification: https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/blob/7e18d86d65ee681e8ae912b6a032a1bae3cae570/src/lib/DPoP.ts#L25-L35
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open an issue in the identity-token-verifier repository.
- Email: [email protected]
Source: GitHub Advisory Database
Published: about 2 years ago
Updated: 5 months ago
npm:@solid/identity-token-verifierVersions: < 0.5.2
Fixed in: 0.5.2